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Abstract
The low price of allowances has been a frequently noted featured of the implementation
of the sulfur dioxide emissions market of the U.S. Acid Rain Program. This paper
presents theoretical and numerical analyses that explain the gap between expected and
observed allowance prices. The main contributing factors appear to be expectation errors
augmented by the presence of irreversible investments.
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2Explaining low sulfur dioxide allowance prices:
The effect of expectation errors and irreversibility1
1. Introduction
One of the most noted features of emissions trading under the U.S. Acid
Rain Program (Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments) has been the lower than
expected price of sulfur dioxide (SO2) allowances.2  While seen initially as a sign of
allowance market failure, the lower than expected price of SO2 allowances is now touted
as evidence that emissions trading can dramatically lower the cost of compliance with
environmental policy. Allowance prices and costs are related but distinct concepts.  The
focus of this paper is allowance prices and particularly the disparity between projected
and actual allowance prices in the early years of Phase 1. Costs have been lower than
expected, but not as low as some of the more exaggerated claims, which rest on a poor
understanding of past forecasts and a faulty analysis of the relation between allowance
prices and abatement cost (Smith et al., 1998). After reviewing the various arguments that
have been advanced to explain lower than expected allowance prices, we contribute some
new ones and then conduct a numerical assessment of the relative importance of the
principal causes.
In theory, the price of allowances should reflect the marginal cost of compliance,3
which early studies of compliance cost estimated at about $300 per ton, although it was
possible to find even higher estimates.4 The interest in low allowance prices began with
EPA’s first annual auction in March 1993.  The auction clearing price was $131, much
below the few previous bilateral trades and contemporaneous estimates of experts
concerning the value of allowances.  The subsequent development of a relatively active
private allowance market demonstrated that this early auction price was not “too low”
and that, if anything, it provided an accurate, early signal of future allowance values.  As
is now well known, allowance prices sank thereafter to a low slightly below $70 in early
1996, and it was only in April 1998 that prices again regained the level of the clearing
price in the 1993 auction.
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3A number of explanations for the lower than expected price for allowances have
been advanced:
(i) The design flaws of EPA auctions (Cason, 1993 and 1995; and Cason and
Plot, 1996);
(ii) Uncertainty regarding the rate-making treatment of allowances traded
(Burtraw, 1996; Rose, 1994; and Bohi and Burtraw, 1992);
(iii) Barriers to trading (Winebrake et al., 1995);
(iv) Transaction costs (Doucet and Strauss, 1994);
(v) Technology innovation (Burtraw, 1996);
(vi) Proliferation of new allowances above the original distribution (Rico
1995; and Conrad and Kohn, 1996);
(vii) Stringent local regulations (Coggins and Swinton, 1996);
(viii) Political pressures and “perverse incentives” in the form of bonus
allowances to install uneconomical high-cost irreversible technologies—
scrubbers (Burtraw, 1996);5 and
(ix) Unanticipated cost-based market penetration of western low sulfur coal,
mainly from the Powder River Basin (PRB) in northeast Wyoming
(Ellerman and Montero, 1998).
The first four reasons, which can be grouped as “market imperfection”
explanations,6 do not seem to have much empirical support. All are plausible, and some
were weakly consistent with empirical data when allowances first started trading.  Still,
they cannot explain the even lower prices that accompanied the large and increasing
trading activity reported by Joskow et al. (1998), who note inter alia that the EPA
auctions constitute a very small portion of the allowance market. In the same vein, Bailey
(1998) finds little evidence that public utility commission rulings have discouraged
trading. Even if transaction costs are present, it is not clear a priori whether the market
price would be higher, lower, or unchanged (Stavins 1995; and Montero, 1998a). The last
five reasons can be classified as “expectation error” explanations, with the possible
exception of endogenous technological innovation. For example, expectations that fail to
take into account bonus allowances awarded to utilities for installing scrubbers will
certainly overestimate allowance prices. A similar result will occur if new SO2 state
regulations other than Title IV are not considered.
Any attempt to explain the difference between projected and observed prices
requires defining an “expected price” and its underlying assumptions. For the purpose of
this paper, we use the expected price provided by EPRI (1993) as the benchmark against
which the importance of the different expectation errors can be assessed. EPRI (1993)
stands out among the early studies of compliance with the U.S. Acid Rain Program for
the detail of its forecast and its explicit assumptions, with which the later actual data can
be compared. In particular, it included the Phase I extension allowances for scrubbers,
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4which account for most of the allowances above the original distribution.7 EPRI (1993)
also predicted an expected equilibrium allowance price of $273 under favourable trading
conditions.8 This expectation was well above actual prices in early Phase 1, but it was a
well-informed estimate that reflected expected prices at the time when electric utilities
were defining their compliance strategies for Phase 1.9
Table 1. Reduction and compliance costs in 1995 (in 1995$)
Method of Compliance       Emission reduction Avg. Cost Min Max Total Cost
tons of SO2 percentage $/ton $/ton $/ton million $
Title IV Scrubbers 1,733,743 45% 267 186 773 463.1
Non-Title IV Scrubbers 20,698 1% 65 65 65 1.3
Coal Switching 1,707,819 44% 153 60 297 261.3
Non-cost switching 425,242 11% 0 0 0 0.0
Total 3,887,502 100% 187 0 773 725.7
Source: Ellerman et al. (1997)
As we will explain below, forecast or expectation errors cannot fully explain the
difference between the EPRI’s figure and actual prices. The irreversibility of many
compliance decisions has an augmenting effect upon prices. Capital investments, such as
in scrubbers, are irreversible; and even decisions to switch to low-sulfur coals can have
irreversible elements, when the coal is obtained by multi-year contract with fixed prices.
As shown in Table 1, scrubbers played an important role in Phase 1 compliance, and
these decisions were based, among other things, on expectations of allowance prices that
existed in 1992-93, before there was “good” information about allowance prices. The
importance of fixed price, multi-year contracts for low sulfur coal is not as easy to
determine, but they were likely important in early Phase 1, although their influence will
not be as lasting as scrubbers.10 Once made, these compliance decisions will be
maintained even if the price expectation turns out to be wrong. The capital is sunk, and
the contract committed to, and abatement will be performed so long as the current price
does not fall below the variable abatement cost (zero for  long-term contracts). Thus, to
the extent that compliance decisions are irreversible, the effect on the current price will
be greater than otherwise. Were the irreversible elements small in importance,
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5expectation errors would not matter much. Similarly, if expectation errors were small or
offsetting, irreversibility would not matter much. However, when irreversible elements
loom large, as they do in Phase 1, and the errors in expectation are large or compounding,
actual prices will be much lower (or higher) than they would otherwise be.
Results from numerical exercises indicate that after controlling for the expectation
errors and irreversibility of some abatement investments, EPRI’s 1995 equilibrium price
of $273 drops to $106—almost equal to the actual 1995-96 average of $105.
Unanticipated cost-based expansion of PRB coal accounts for 60% of the drop, while
irreversibility accounts for 27%. The remaining 13% is divided almost evenly between
two others factors not included in EPRI (1993): voluntary participation from non-affected
sources and the more intensive utilization of units retrofitted with scrubbers. Keeping in
mind that this paper is not about price volatility (or how the market clears in the short
run) but rather about long-term trends, we conclude that expectation errors and
irreversibility explain reasonably well the observed gap between projected and observed
prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the
sources of expectation errors and their effect on prices. Section 3 illustrates the
augmenting effect of irreversible investments on prices using a static model. Section 4
develops a dynamic model of the allowance market to simulate the effects of expectation
error and irreversibility. This model is then used in section 5 to conduct a numerical
experiment to illustrate the effects on allowance prices. Concluding remarks follow.
2. Sources of Expectation Errors
There were undoubtedly many sources of error in pre-Phase 1 forecasts of
allowance prices, but three factors are particularly significant. First, for reasons largely
unrelated to the Acid Rain Program, low-sulfur coal from the western U.S. became
economically attractive to many mid-western plants that had been burning local high
sulfur coal. As a result, the amount of abatement required to meet the cap in both Phases
1 and 2 was reduced considerably. Second, electric utilities made unexpectedly large use
of the voluntary opt-in provisions of the Program, and this had the effect of reducing
marginal costs (and allowance prices), as well as slightly loosening the emissions cap.
Third, units with retrofitted scrubbers were dispatched far more intensively during Phase
1 than had been expected.  The result was to produce more cheap (short-run) abatement
than had been expected, with consequent effect on allowance prices. In this section, we
explain each of these reasons for lower than expected counterfactual emissions and
marginal costs.
6Table 2. Statistics of Phase 1 and Phase 2 Units for Selected Years
Variables Table A units Substitution units
in 1995a
Eligible Phase 2




No. of units 263 182 438 1370
Total capacity (MW) 88,007 41,643 97,812 286,677
No. of coal-fired units 257 154 299 472
No. units with NSPS scrubbers 1 25 31 139
No. units with Title IV scrubbers 26 0 0 0
Total Baseline8587 (1012 Btu) 4,363 1,740 3,223 9,228
Total Heat Input 90 (1012 Btu) 4,391 1,847 3,574 9,853
Total Heat Input 93 (1012 Btu) 4,395 1,718 3,890 10,137
Total Heat Input 95 (1012 Btu) 4,708 1,931 4,579 10,552
Total SO2 Emissions 1985 (103 ton) 9,302 1,377 2,104 3,309
Total SO2 Emissions 1990 (103 ton) 8,683 1,272 2,386 3,382
Total SO2 Emissions 1993 (103 ton) 7,579 973 2,505 3,715
Total SO2 Emissions 1995 (103 ton) 4,445 853 2,884 3,644
Average SO2 Rate 1985 (#/mmBtu) 4.24 1.58 1.31 0.72
Average SO2 Rate 1990 (#/mmBtu) 3.76 1.38 1.34 0.69
Average SO2 Rate 1993 (#/mmBtu) 3.45 1.13 1.29 0.73
Average SO2 Rate 1995 (#/mmBtu) 1.89 .88 1.26 0.69
1995 Allowances (103) 7,215 1,329 - -
   Basic 5,551 - - -
   Extension 1,350 - - -
   Substitution 1,329 - -
   Early reduction credits 314 - - -
   1995 EPA auction c 150 - - -
a. It includes 7 compensating units.
b. These are eligible units that did not opt in.
c. Not necessarily all of them went to Table A unit.
2.1 Rail deregulation and PRB coal
As shown in Table 2, the pre-1995 reduction of SO2 emissions at Table A units,
those that were mandated to be subject to Phase 1, is substantial.11  Between 1985 and
1993, heat input (generation) at these units was constant, but total emissions declined by
1.7 million tons, or by almost 20%. Furthermore, the trend started before 1990, when the
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7legislation containing the Acid Rain Program was enacted. Earlier research (Ellerman and
Montero, 1998) has addressed the reasons for this unanticipated decline in emissions and
found that it was caused primarily by changes in the economics of coal choice.
Specifically, the decline in  transportation costs associated with the deregulation of rail
rates in the 1980s made low sulfur coal from the western U.S., mostly from the Powder
River Basin (PRB), economically competitive in the Midwest, where a large proportion
of the Table A units were located.12 Their econometric analyses indicate that 1993 SO2
emissions from coal-fired units were 2.17 million tons below what emissions would have
been if emission rates had not changed from 1985, and that 92% (2.0 million tons) of that
reduction was due to changes related to the greater economic attractiveness of western
coals.13 As can be seen in Table 1, this trend continued in 1995. Approximately 11% of
the reduction effected in 1995 consisted of switching to lower sulfur fuels at no
identifiable additional cost, of which amount 87% was accounted for by PRB coals.
Ellerman and Montero (1998) has been conducted within a static framework
in which productivity improvements in rail transportation and the consequent
lower rates are treated as exogenous to the Acid Rain Program. It is possible that
the flexibility associated with emissions trading, and more particularly the lack of
any technology mandate, has encouraged innovation and investment in a wide
array of SO2 compliance options, including the transportation of low sulfur coal
from the West (Burtraw; 1996 and EPA, 1996). Whatever the extent of such
stimulative effects, they were not incorporated in earlier forecasts of SO2
emissions and prices. Therefore, failing to account for them should also be
considered as “expectation errors.”
2.2 Voluntary opt-in
The Acid Rain Program includes two additional provisions, less noted during the
legislative debate, under which Phase 2 units—those units that are not mandatorily
affected until year 2000—can voluntarily opt-in into Phase 1.14 The Substitution
Provision was created to reduce compliance costs by allowing the owner (or operator) of
any of the 263 Table A units to substitute emission reductions by a designated non-
affected unit, so-called substitution unit, under the owner’s control for reductions
otherwise required of Table A units. The Reduced Utilization Provision was created to
prevent owners of Table A units from meeting their emissions reduction obligations by
switching generation to non-affected units. If generation at a Table A unit was reduced
significantly for compliance reasons, one or more non-Table A units, so-called
compensating units, had to be brought under Phase 1 to compensate. As explained by
Montero (1998b), resort to the Reduced Utilization Provision has been slight; however,
participation with the Substitution Provision has been significant. Among the more than
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8600 eligible substitution units, 182 did so in 1995. These units increased Phase 1 affected
generating capacity by 47% (see Table 2).
Despite the presence of these provisions and the large response, none of the
earlier studies of compliance cost included such units.  The general view seems to have
been that there would be few substitutions or that substitutions would have no effect on
allowance prices.  Yet, the entry of such units will reduce compliance costs and
allowance prices for two reasons.  First, the inclusion of units with lower marginal costs
shifts the marginal abatement curve downward and with it, the equilibrium price.
Second, the use of historic emissions as the basis for allocating allowances to volunteers
inevitably creates adverse selection problems (Montero, 1998c). Units whose emissions
decline subsequent to the baseline period for other reasons will opt-in and receive excess
allowances (allowances above their true counterfactual), which raises the cap and reduces
the total amount of abatement required.  Units whose emissions do not decline, or
increase, will have no such incentive, and typically they will not opt-in.
Figure 1. Effect of voluntary opt-in on prices
To illustrate, consider the one-
period model of Figure 1. Let q be
the aggregate quantity of emissions
reductions and CTA(q) the aggregate
control costs from affected sources
(Table A units). As usual, we have
that C'(q) > 0, C''(q) > 0. Let qTA be
the emissions reduction target chosen
by the authority to be imposed on
Table A units. Without the
substitution provision, the equilibrium
price is pTA.
With the inclusion of
substitution units having lower
marginal control costs, the new
marginal control cost curve shifts
downward to ¢C qTAS ( ) . If substitution unit emissions in the year of compliance would
have been equal to or greater than the historic emissions baseline, the reduction target
remains unchanged and the equilibrium price would be pTAS. However, if some
substitution units have reduced their counterfactual emissions levels below their historic
emissions and in this case below the allowance allocation, the original reduction target











9Therefore, the equilibrium price drops from pTA to ¢pTAS , and reduction from Table A
units is only ¢qTA .
15
As shown in Table 2, the number of excess allowances and emissions reductions
are modest compared to the corresponding totals in 1995—247,000 allowances and
229,000 tons, respectively (Montero, 1998b). Nevertheless, the Substitution Provision
remains active during the five years of Phase 1 and its cumulative effect on prices may
not be negligible.16
2.3 Higher utilization of scrubbed units
It is evident from Table 1 that scrubbing has been extensively used by electric
utilities to comply with the Acid Rain Program. Fully half of the entire 4 million ton
reduction of emissions in early Phase I has been achieved by units retrofitted with
scrubbers. It has been less widely appreciated that these generally large units have been
utilized more intensively after the retrofit than before. The utilization of the 27 units
retrofitted with scrubbers for Phase 1 has increased from an average of 62% for the years
1988-94 to 79% for the years 1995-97, or by 27%.  In contrast, the average utilization of
non-scrubbed Table A units have increased from 56% to 60% over the same years.17
Obviously, with the onset of Title IV, generation has shifted to the units retrofitted with
scrubbers.  Since these units have considerably lower emissions than non-scrubbed Table
A units, the effect of this shift in generation is to provide more abatement from the
scrubbed units and to require less from the non-scrubbed units than had been expected.
The observed Phase 1 shifting of generation to scrubbed units has a plausible
explanation. Consider a price-taker utility operator subject to SO2 limits that maximizes
the (short-run) profit function
p = - - +p y c y q p e y q p zE A A( , ) ( , ) (1)
where y is electricity output, pE is the exogenous market price of electricity; c(·) is the
generation cost function that depends on the level of electricity output and emission
abatement q and has the usual convexity properties such that ¶c/¶y, ¶2c/¶y2, ¶c/¶q,
¶
2
c/¶q2 > 0 ; e(·) are emissions that depend on output and abatement such that ¶e/¶y > 0
and ¶e/¶q = -1, pA is the price of allowances, and z are grandfathered allowances. Both
functional forms c(·) and e(·) will also depend on the abatement technology chosen by the
operator that in our case can be either coal switching or scrubbing.
Solving for the first order conditions for y and q leads to
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The left-hand-side is the marginal cost of generation for an individual unit in a broader
electricity market. In the absence of an abatement constraint, in this case Title IV, ¶c/¶q =
0, so that the second-term on the right-hand-side is not present, and ¶c/¶y = pE. However,
when the operator faces a binding constraint, the second term becomes negative, and it is
an additional cost element to be considered in evaluating a particular unit’s relative
competitive position. If this additional cost element is uniform for all units, competitive
positions will be unchanged, but typically this will not be the case. In particular, where
some units are affected and others are not, the relative position of the affected units
would be made worse and, for unchanged aggregate production, output from affected
sources would be expected to drop. This effect is usually called output “leakage.”
Although equation (2) assumes continuous and convex functions, it can be used to
compare the relative ex-post dispatch position of two affected sources, one relying on
scrubbing (scr) and the other on coal switching (sw), before and after compliance with
Title IV. The variable costs of abatement for scrubbing and switching are different. The
variable cost of abatement for scrubbing is relatively low and constant, depending on the
cost of limestone, power, and disposal.18 With the possible exception of March 1996,
allowance prices have been higher than the constant marginal abatement cost of
scrubbing, and in general, the allowance price can be expected to rise over time. In
contrast, the variable cost of abatement for switching depends on the cost of allowances
and on the sulfur premium paid for the lower sulfur coal. When coal and allowance
markets are integrated, that is, when the coal sulfur premium reflects the equivalent value
of an allowance, the marginal abatement cost incurred by switched units will be equal to
allowance prices. Thus, when coal and allowance markets are integrated, [¶c/¶q]scr <
[¶c/¶q]sw = pA. Furthermore, the characteristics of the two abatement technologies are
such that the increase of emissions associated with increased generation is greater for
switched units than for scrubbed units, so that [¶e/¶y]scr < [¶e/¶y]sw.19 Plugging these
expressions into (2), these conditions imply that, ex post [¶c/¶y]scr > [¶c/¶y]sw, which
suggests that [y]scr > [y]sw.
While the above model illustrates how differing marginal abatement costs will
affect utilization among affected units, it does not capture the full story about the
integration of electricity, coal and allowance markets. Units with retrofitted scrubbers
will also have a strong incentive to move to cheaper, higher sulfur coals with consequent
effect on unit dispatch. In addition, when coal and allowance markets are integrated,
generation costs for non-affected sources  change, and in ways that do not necessarily
lead to output leakage.
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Table 3.  Phase 1 effect on dispatch cost
Sulfur Content of Coal (lbs of SO2/mmBtu)
Units Type 2.0 4.0 6.0
Pre-Phase 1
  Coal Cost $24.00 $24.00 $24.00
  Allowance Cost 0 0 0
  Scrubber Cost 0 0 0
  Total Cost $24.00 $24.00 $24.00
  Kwh equivalent (¢/kwh) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Phase 1 Switched Unit
  Coal Cost $27.60 $24.00 $20.60
  Allowance Cost 3.60 7.20 10.80
  Scrubber Cost 0 0 0
  Total Cost $31.20 $31.20 $31.20
  Kwh equivalent (¢/kwh) 1.30 1.30 1.30
Phase 1 Scrubbed Unit
  Coal Cost $27.60 $24.00 $20.60
  Allowance Cost 0.18 0.36 0.54
  Scrubber Cost 1.48 2.96 4.45
  Total Cost $29.26 $27.32 $25.59
  Kwh equivalent (¢/kwh) 1.22 1.14 1.07
Non Phase 1 Unit
  Coal Cost $27.60 $24.00 $20.40
  Allowance Cost 0 0 0
  Scrubber Cost 0 0 0
  Total Cost $27.60 $24.00 $20.40
  Kwh equivalent (¢/kwh) 1.15 1.00 0.85
Table 3 presents an illustrative example of the complete phenomenon. Each panel
represents the costs associated with the use of coals having a sulfur content of 2, 4 and 6
lbs. of SO2 per million Btu (hereafter #), respectively. Consider that the respective coals,
which are of equal Btu content (12,000 Btu/lbs.), sell for the same price, $24.00 per ton
of coal before Title IV becomes effective. In other words, there is no sulfur premium
over this range.20 The electricity equivalent cost of the coal is calculated at an assumed
heat rate of 10,000 Btu/kwh, so that, for instance, a ton of coal generates 2,400 kilowatt-
hours (kwh). Thus, prior to Phase 1, the fuel cost component of electricity generated from
these coals would be 1.0¢ per kwh. The Phase 1 costs associated with allowances and
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variable scrubber costs are calculated per ton of coal, based on a $150 value for
allowances and variable scrubbing costs of $65 per ton of SO2 removed.
The second and third panels show that for any given coal, scrubbed units will
incur less of an increase in variable costs than non-scrubbed units.21  These two panels
also show that the additional cost associated with Phase 1 for the non-scrubbed unit is
constant with respect to sulfur content. Although allowance cost increases with sulfur
content, the price of coal decreases commensurately in an integrated market.  More
importantly for explaining the shift of generation to scrubbed units, the additional cost
can be reduced by scrubbed units if they can switch to higher sulfur coals. Whereas the
scrubbed unit may have been indifferent between the 4# and the 6# coal pre-Phase 1, or
prevented from using the 6# by State Implementation Plan emission limits, it would now
make sense to purchase the higher sulfur coal.  In effect, the unit would incur additional
compliance cost of $78.75 per additional ton of SO2 input, but realize savings in fuel cost
of $150.
Finally, the dispatch of units that are not part of Phase 1 are also affected by the
integration of coal and allowance markets. Very high sulfur coal units (6# in Table 3)
would experience a fall in generation cost since fuel prices would be lower. There are
relatively few of these units, and they are small, since all units with emissions greater
than 2.5#/mmBtu and larger than 100 MWe were included in Phase 1. The far more
numerous set of units are those with emissions less than 2.5#/mmBtu. The dispatch cost
of these units will be increased as a result of the higher prices for low sulfur coal relative
to higher sulfur coal. The increase in cost will not be as great as for non-scrubbed Phase 1
units, but as shown it can be greater than for scrubbed units using the 6# coal. To the
extent that any of these non-Phase I affected units can shift to higher sulfur coals, the
effect on dispatch will be lessened, but that possibility will depend on the availabilty and
cost of higher sulfur coals and local emission limits.
 Although the explanation for the increased utilization of scrubbed units seems
rather obvious in retrospect, this effect does not seem to have been anticipated.  Rather,
most studies of the cost of abatement SO2 by scrubbing assumed that the retrofitted units
would achieve the same utilization as before. In any case, the implications for allowance
prices are clear. The aggregate marginal abatement cost curve shifts downward and so
does the equilibrium price of allowances.
3. Augmenting Effect of Irreversible Commitments
Many of the investments made to comply with the Acid Rain Program are
irreversible. Scrubbing, for instance, is capital-intensive and the contracting and
construction lead-time for placing a scrubber in service is two to three years.
Consequently, decisions to comply with SO2 limits by scrubbing required irreversible
capital commitments in 1993 or before, when prices were expected to be around $300.
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With early Phase 1 allowance prices of around $100-150, the ex-ante economics of
building scrubbers would not have been as favorable; however, when those prices
appeared, the capital had been sunk. With operating costs at about $65 per ton (Ellerman
et al., 1997), the ex-post economics of operating the scrubbers continued to be favorable.
As a result, the supply of allowances from scrubbed units is relatively insensitive to
changes in allowance prices, unless they fall below the $65 mark.
Although fuel switching is generally a more flexible form of compliance, coal
contracts can and do contain irreversible elements as well.22 Any utility planning to
comply by switching to lower sulfur coal would have had to decide whether to sign a
long-term contract for the low sulfur coal before 1995 or to procure the coal on the spot
market, or some combination thereof. In either case, a premium would be paid for the
lower sulfur product, and the choice would be whether to lock in a premium (and the Btu
value of the coal) in 1993 or 1994 or to pay whatever the spot market required in 1995
and thereafter.  To the extent that the utility contracts early for the lower sulfur coal, it is
constrained from switching to a higher sulfur coal later, should allowance prices be
lower. Thus, the abatement associated with long-term contracts for low sulfur coal is
irreversible until the contract expires or is otherwise terminated.


























                                                
22
 See Joskow (1987).
14
The implications of irreversibility for allowance prices can be better explained
with the one-period model illustrated in Figure 2. Think of a system with two groups of
emitting sources that are subject to an aggregate level of SO2 emissions reduction qT. We
let the first group (R) be the units that are installing reversible abatement technologies
(e.g. switching under no contracts) and the second group (I), the units that are installing
irreversible technologies (e.g. scrubbers and switching under contracts). Note that for the
first group short and long-run marginal control costs are the same, while for the second
group short-run marginal costs are much lower.
The diagram in Figure 2 is arbitrarily drawn such that the origin of the aggregate
marginal control cost curve for the first group ( ¢CR ) is the left-hand axis and the origin of
the aggregate (short and long-run) marginal cost curve for the second group
( ¢CI SR( ) , ¢CI LR( ) ) is the right-hand axis. Also, the marginal control costs for either group
need not be zero at q = 0. So drawn, the diagram gives all possible allocations of the total
qT units of emissions reductions between the two group of units.
Setting aside inefficient investments, those that would have been made regardless
expected prices (i.e., think of qT as the reduction required after subtracting for the
reduction from the inefficient investments),23 the optimal reductions from each group are
qR and qI, respectively, and the equilibrium price is p0. Under these circumstance all
reductions from irreversible investments, scrubbers and switching under contracts, are
cost-effective. No emissions are abated at a cost higher than p0. Now, if counterfactual
emissions are lower or more allowances are distributed than had been initially expected,
the emissions reduction obligation is reduced from qT to ~qT . This is the same as to say
that ¢CR  shifts inwards to ¢
~CR . If everything is reversible so that ¢ ” ¢C CI SR I LR( ) ( ) , the new
optimal reduction allocation among groups would be ~qR  and ~qI , respectively, and the
equilibrium price would be pR. Because of irreversibility however, reductions from
irreversible investments remain at the qI level, so that reductions from reversible
investments are only ~q qT I- . The new equilibrium price is pI, which is determined along
¢~CR , and it will be even lower than pR.  The augmenting effect of irreversible investments
is simply the further drop in prices from pR to pI.
Similarly, if ¢CR  shifts outward to ¢$CR  as the result of unexpectedly higher
electricity demand and some of the additional abatement capacity required can not be
installed immediately (e.g., scrubbers), there can be also an augmenting effect that would
last only until that capacity is installed. In this case, the price temporarily jumps to $pI
instead of $pR .
                                                
23
 Those forced by political reasons aimed at protecting local high-sulfur coal miners.
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4. Modeling Expectation Errors and Irreversibility in a Dynamic Context
The ability to bank allowances in Phase 1 means that the effect of an error in
expectation is not limited to the current price of allowances.  Without banking, the
current price would reflect current demand and supply only, including the full
consequences of any errors.  With banking, expected demand and supply in future
periods is also taken into account.  For instance,  if a very low price in the current period
is below the present value of expected future marginal cost, a party might decide to hold
the allowances (and even buy more) in order to defer expected Phase 2 abatement
requirements.
In this section we set up a very simple model (Schennach, 1998) to understand the
effect on market variables of the errors in expectation and irreversibility identified in the
preceding section. Besides the effect on today’s prices, we are also interested in the size
of the bank at the end of Phase 1, the year when the bank expires, and the allowance price
at that time (i.e. long-run equilibrium price). We start by setting the condition on total
emissions during the banking period, which is










ò ò ò= - + -( ) ( ) (3)
where qt are aggregate emissions reduction at time t, ut are aggregate unrestricted (or
baseline) emissions in period t, zt are total allowance allocated in period t, T1 is the time
when Phase 1 ends, and T is the time when the bank expires during Phase 2. Equation (3)
simply establishes that the total reduction in emissions over the entire banking period
(0,T) must be equal to the sum of the annual differences between aggregate
counterfactual emissions and allowance allocations during Phase 1 (0,T1) and Phase 2
(T1,T).  Equivalently, total emissions during the banking period must be equal to total
allowances distributed in those years. For simplicity we will assume a constant baseline
throughout, and constant allowance allocations in each period such that  ut – zt = g1 for
Phase 1, and ut – zt = g2 for Phase 2. A necessary condition for banking is that less
abatement is required in Phase 1 than in Phase 2, so that g1 < g2.  With marginal cost
rising as a function of abatement, total emissions in Phase 1 will be less than the
allowance allocation, and for the years in Phase 2 when the bank is being drawn down,
emissions will be higher than the allowance allocations in those years.  At time T, the
following terminal condition must also hold,
q u zT T T= - = g 2 (4)
which indicates that after exhaustion of the bank, emissions will be equal to allowances.
From then on, we assume this condition continues to hold.
We model the aggregate abatement cost curve in a very simple way
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C q qt j t( ) = a 2 (5)
where aj is a cost parameter for Phase j (j=1,2). Since the universe of units affected in
Phase 1 is originally restricted to Table A units, we do not expect the Phase 1 cost curve
to be identical to the Phase 2 cost curve. Just as the entry of substitution units shifts the
Table A cost curve downwards, as illustrated in Figure 1, so will the entry of other low
cost Phase 2 units.24 The extent of the shift, that is, of the extent to which cheaper
abatement becomes available in Phase 2, will be indicated by the horizontal distance
between the two curves. Consequently, we expect that a1 > a2. If agents have perfect
foresight and the market is always in long-term equilibrium, prices will be equal to (long-
run) marginal costs in every period, and they will rise at some interest rate until the bank
runs out. In a continuous time setting, this is
 p C q p et t t t





 " ˛t T( , )0 (6)
where pt is the allowance price at time t, r is the interest rate, and Dt is an infinitesimal
time increment.
From (5) and (6) we can establish that q q et T r T t= - -( )  if 0 < t £ T1, and
q q et T
r T t= - -( / ) ( )a a1 2  if T1 < t £ T. Note that the discontinuity in the Phase 1 and Phase
2 cost curves (a1>a2) will cause an increase in abatement at T1 equal to the horizontal
distance between the two cost curves. Plugging these expressions into (3) and using the
terminal condition (4), we can solve for T
































1 1 1 1, (7)
which in turn permits us to solve for the size of the bank at the end of Phase 1 (B)
( )B
r
r T T e r T T= - + -- -
g 2
1
1 1( ) ( ) , (8)
the long-run equilibrium price (pT)
pT = a g2 2 , (9)






                                                
24
  Although many of these units would be represented in the Phase 1 cost curve through the substitution
provision, not all Phase 2 units were eligible to become substitution units.
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With the aid of the system of eqs. (7)-(10), we can explore how changes in cost
(a) and required abatement (g), affect T, B, pT, and p0. The unanticipated intrusion of
PRB coal in Midwestern high sulfur markets reduces the counterfactual in both Phase 1
and Phase 2, so that g1 and g2 are lower. Voluntary compliance by substitution units and
early reduction credits affect only Phase 1 parameters, by lowering both a1 (from cheaper
reductions) and g1 (from excess allowances and extra allowances). The higher utilization
of scrubbers has effect throughout by reducing both a1 and a2. The effect of
irreversibility can be represented through changes in the a parameters. Ex post inefficient
choices reduce marginal costs; however, as time passes and the price rises, some of the
initially ex-post inefficient irreversible investment becomes efficient. Therefore,
irreversibility has the effect of lowering a1 more than a2. It may be the case that a2 does
not change at all if prices rise high enough before the end of Phase 1.
5. Numerical Model
The effect of errors in expectation and the augmenting effect of irreversibility can
be quantified by a simple numerical exercise that applies the theoretical framework for
market dynamics to the benchmark provided by EPRI (1993).
5.1 The benchmark
In this section we define and estimate the different “market” conditions regarding
allowance allocations, counterfactual emissions, discount rate, and marginal control costs
that yield the equilibrium price of $273 for 1995 in EPRI (1993). Emissions caps for
Phase 1 and Phase 2 are obtained directly from EPRI (1993). In the case of Phase 1, it
corresponds to aggregate allowances to affected units plus counterfactual emissions from
non-affected units. Among the allowances of Phase 1, EPRI (1993) does not include any
substitution allowances and early reduction credits. For Phase 2, the emission cap is equal
to aggregate allowances, which remains the same for the period 2000-2010.25
Counterfactual emissions are also obtained directly from EPRI (1993).
To estimate the (long-run) marginal control cost curves, we use an indirect
approach by fitting an aggregate control cost curve Cj for Phase j (j=1,2) of the form
C q qj j( ) = a 2 (11)
where q is the amount of reduction, and a is a cost parameter to be estimated
econometrically with the following specification
p q P qt t t t t= × + × × +b b e1 2 2 (12)
                                                
25
 If necessary to go beyond 2010 we will use the 2000-10 cap.
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where pt is equilibrium price in period t and equal to the (long-term) marginal cost ¢Ct , qt
is the amount of cost-effective reduction in year t, P2t is a dummy to control for Phase 2
and equals one if t ‡ 2000, and e is the usual error term.26 We obtain 12 price/marginal-
cost and quantity “observations” for the banking period posited in EPRI(1993), 1995
through 2006, by using EPRI’s emissions reduction profile for those years, and by
applying a 6% real discount rate (as in EPRI, 1993) to the initial allowance price of
$273.27 The resulting OLS regression results are given in the first column of Table 4 and
the parameter estimates yield a1 = 0.1667 and a2 = 0.1621.














Adj. R2 0.9996 0.9931 0.9893
Observations 12 12 12
**
 significant at the 99% level, * significant at the 90% level
The first row of Table 5 (step 0) presents our benchmark based on EPRI (1993).
The four variables that will be affected by errors in expectation and irreversibility are
shown, followed by the allowance allocations for various years and the counterfactual
emissions assumed for Phases 1 and 2.  In the EPRI benchmark, the equilibrium
allowance price in 1995 (p95 ” p0) is $273; and it rises to $519 (pT) when the bank runs
out in year 2006 (T). The accumulated Phase 1 bank (B) is 8.15 million allowances.
                                                
26
 We adopt the quadratic not only for simplicity, but also because it provides the best fit (see Table 4).
27
 We control for 579,000 tons of SO2 reductions that were found to come from non-cost effective
scrubbers. Large part of those were under the DOE’s Clean Coal Technology Program. We assume these
reductions would have taken place regardless expectations of allowance prices and therefore are not part of
the cost-effective reductions.
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Table 5. Numerical data and results
p95 T PT B Cap (106 allowances) Counterfactual (106 ton)
STEPS $/ton $/ton 106 allow. 1995-96 1997-99 2000-15 1995-99 2000-15
(0) 273.2 2006 519.0 8.15 14.45 13.28 9.40 16.29-.50 16.56
(1) 172.9 2008 368.8 9.32 14.14 12.97 9.40 14.39-.60 14.65
(2) 163.0 2009 368.5 11.34 14.71-.39 13.22 9.40 14.39-.60 14.65
(3) 150.9 2009 341.3 11.67 14.71-.39 13.22 9.40 14.39-.60 14.65
(4) 106.3 2015 340.9 14.50 14.71-.39 13.22 9.40 14.39-.60 14.65
Note Numbers are in 1995 dollars. Steps correspond to: (0) EPRI (1993) or benchmark, (1) unanticipated
PRB coal, (2) voluntary opt-in and early reduction credits, (3) higher utilization of scrubbed units, and (4)
irreversibility of some investments.
5.2 Accounting for expectation errors and irreversibility
The remaining rows on Table 5 show the effect of the different factors explained
earlier on the variables, p95, T, pT, and B.  Each new factor is added progressively so that
(1) accounts for the lower counterfactual due to the PRB coal expansion, (2) adds the
effect of voluntary opt-in and the early reduction credits distributed in 1995, (3) adds the
more intensive utilization of scrubbed units, and finally (4) adds irreversibility.
Step (1) sets the new 1995 counterfactual based on data from Ellerman and
Montero (1998) and Ellerman et al. (1997), and then maintains the difference from
EPRI’s (1993) counterfactual for 1995 in all subsequent years.28 For step (2), recall that
the entry of substitution units has two effects.  The entry of the cheaper units shifts the
marginal cost curve downwards, while the adverse selection effect results in a slight
loosening of the cap. We account for these effects by increasing the annual allowance
issuance in Phase 1 by 247,000 allowances, the number of excess allowances in 1995
(Montero, 1998b), and by shifting the Phase 1 curve to the right by an amount equal to
the reduction of emissions effected by these units in 1995.29 In addition, we add early
reduction credit allowances, as indicated in Table 2, for 1995 only.
In step (3), we shift the Phase 1 and Phase 2 cost curves downward by the number
of tons equal to the increased average heat input at scrubbed units times the difference in
1995 emission rates between these units and non-scrubbed units. Econometrics results
based on 1995 data indicate an additional reduction of approximately 228,620 tons. We
assume that higher utilization of scrubbers remain the same for all the subsequent years.30
                                                
28
 We also run a simulation exercise using EPRI (1995) counterfactual, which is slightly higher (1.8%) than
that ours, with similar results. In Table 5, the Phase I cap is also reduced to reflect the PRB effect on non-
Phase I units.
29
 See Montero (1998b) for more details. Based on EPA (1997), a preliminary analysis of 1996 compliance
indicates that this is a reasonably assumption and that may even be conservative.
30
 We also note that the expected amount of reduction from scrubbers was a little higher since Baldwin was
never installed. All the other scrubbers were considered by EPRI (1993).
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Finally in step (4), the cost curves are also shifted downward, but in a much more
complicated way.  We assume that all scrubbers and a portion of long-term contract are
ex-post inefficient and irreversible, but that over time this amount diminishes as contracts
expire or allowance prices rise to equal the long-run marginal cost associated with these
commitments.31 Since the “new” pT is greater than $300, the approximate price
expectation for most of the commitments, these investments will enter eventually, but
much later during Phase 2. In the meantime, they remain ex-post inefficient for being
made too early. These adjustments result in a series of annual short-run cost curves that
approach the long-run curve over time.
5.3 Numerical results and discussion
The combined effect of all factors is a significantly lower allowance price for
1995 (p95) and one close to the 1995 average of $129, and almost equal to the 1995-96
average of $105. The most important factors explaining the low allowance prices in early
Phase 1 are lower counterfactual emissions (step 1) and the irreversibility of many
compliance actions (step 4). In fact, unanticipated declining emissions and irreversible
investments account for 60% and 27% of the p95 drop from $273 to $106, respectively.
The other two factors (steps 2 and 3) account almost equally for the remaining 13%.
These factors also affect the other market variables, T, pT and B, but in different
ways. For instance, the unanticipated expansion of PRB coal (step 1) has significant
effects on the eventual equilibrium price in Phase 2, dropping it from $519 to $369, but
smaller effect on the size of the bank (B) or the end of the banking period (T). The reason
for the small effect on T and B is that the roughly proportionate decrease in
counterfactual emissions does not change the relative costs, that is, the advantage of
Phase 1 over-compliance. This can be explained by looking at eqs. (7) and (8). If both g1
and g2 decrease by Dg, the expression (1 - g1/g2) in (10) increases slightly, as does T.
Although a decrease in g2 leads to a lower B (see eq. [8]), this is more than offset by the
increase in B due to a larger T (¶B/¶T > 0).
Similarly, the higher utilization of scrubbers (step 3) shifts the cost curves in both
Phases 1 and 2 by lowering a2 and a1 in similar proportions.32 The consequent effect on
prices in both phases and the slight effect on T and B can also be explained by looking at
eqs. (7)-(10).  While a decrease in a2 lowers the terminal price pT, a small increase in
a2/a1 slightly increases T and hence B.33 Since our numerical model is discrete, we do
not observe this change in T in Table 5.
In contrast, voluntary compliance and early reduction credits (step 2) and
irreversibility (step 4) have a large effect on B and T, but little effect on pT. This result
                                                
31
 Reductions from long-term contracts in 1995 are found to be 115,000 tons of in 1995 according to
reported contracts in the 1995 Guide to Coal Contracts (by Pasha Publications).
32
 Because of the way we model the higher utilization of scrubbers and provided that a1 > a2, we will have
a slightly larger drop in a1.
33
 It is not difficult to show that ¶T/¶(a2/a1) > 0 in eq. (7).
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occurs because both substitution and irreversibility are Phase 1 phenomena that shift the
marginal cost curve downward and thereby change the relation between Phase 1 and
Phase 2 compliance costs. While substitution takes place exclusively during Phase 1,
irreversibility provides low cost supply mostly during Phase 1.
Our numerical analysis should not be taken as a prediction, much less as a
replication of what would have been the “right” prices in early Phase 1.  Anyone familiar
with the allowance market knows that prices went much lower, to $70, in 1996.  Also, it
is obvious that a 6% real rate of discount cannot explain the increase of prices since then,
and particularly the near doubling of allowance prices between late 1997 and mid 1998.
Instead, our purpose has been to evaluate the relative importance of the several factors
that have caused Phase 1 allowance prices to be much lower than expected. The exercise
should also persuade the reader that early Phase 1 allowance prices are very sensitive to
assumptions about the counterfactual and the location of the marginal cost curves. As
expectations about counterfactual emissions and Phase 1 costs change, so will current
allowance prices, evidently with considerable swings in magnitude.
6. Conclusions
The low price of allowances has been one of the most noted aspects of the sulfur dioxide
emissions market of the U.S. Acid Rain Program. This paper has presented theoretical
and numerical analyses of the gap between expected and observed allowance prices. The
principal explanations appear to be the unanticipated decline of emissions due to the cost-
based market penetration of low sulfur western coal and the augmentation of the effect of
that error by irreversible investments such as scrubbers and long-term contracts with low
sulfur coal suppliers. Other minor factors are voluntary participation of non-affected
sources and the higher than expected utilization of units retrofitted with scrubbers. The
analysis presented here illustrates, as in any real market, the important role of expectation
errors and irreversibility in the evolution of SO2 allowance prices.
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